

Message Text

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USMISSION GENEVA

USDEL MBFR VIENNA

USCINCEUR

USNMR SHAPE

USLOSACLANT

CINCLANT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 USNATO 3322

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MCAP, NATO

SUBJECT: NPG MINISTERIAL MEETING 11-12 JUNE 1974 - AGENDA ITEM II

- NORWAY: NUCLEAR AND BASE POLICY

GENEVA FOR CSCE DEL

SUMMARY: NORWEGIAN MOD FOSTERVOLL DISTRIBUTED STATEMENT ON NORWEGIAN DEFENSE POSTURE. THE STATEMENT DESCRIBED CURRENT NORWEGIAN POLICY REGARDING BASING OF FOREIGN FORCES AND NORWAY'S DECISION NOT TO STOCK NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON NORWEGIAN TERRITORY IN PEACETIME. END SUMMARY.

1. FOLLOWING TEXT WAS DISTRIBUTED TO MINISTERS. NO MINISTERIAL DISCUSSION OCCURED. BEGIN TEXT:

IN GIVING A BRIEF SURVEY OF OUR POLICY CONCERNING ALLIED BASES
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AND STOCKPILING OF NUCLEAR WARHEADS ON NORWEGIAN TERRITORY, I AM
COMPLYING WITH A REQUEST VOICED BY MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE
IT IS AN ATTEMPT TO GIVE A CORRECT DESCRIPTION OF - AND
THE REASONS BEHIND - A POLICY WE CONSISTENTLY HAVE

FOLLOWED FOR MANY YEARS, AND WHICH WILL CONTINUE TO GUIDE OUR FUTURE BEHAVIOUR IN THESE FIELDS.

WHEN NORWAY IN 1949 JOINED THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE, IT MARKED A DECISIVE BREAK WITH THE TRADITIONAL LINE OF NEUTRALITY WHICH HAD BEEN THE HALLMARK OF NORWEGIAN FOREIGN POLICY SINCE NORWAY REGAINED INDEPENDENCE IN 1905 AND RIGHT UP TO THE SECOND WORLD WAR.

WHEN IT WAS ESTABLISHED THAT NO COMMON BASIS COULD BE FOUND FOR A SCANDINAVIAN DEFENCE UNION, NORWAY DECIDED TOGETHER WITH DENMARK AND ICELAND TO JOIN NATO AS A FOUNDER MEMBER. SWEDEN REMAINED NON ALIGNED AND FINLAND, WHICH HAD NOT PARTICIPATED IN THE SCANDINAVIAN DELIBERATIONS, RETAINED HER SPECIAL STATUS OF NEUTRALITY, CONDITIONED BY HER TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP AND MUTUAL SUPPORT WITH THE SOVIET UNION.

THE NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT'S DECISION IN 1949 TO IMPOSE CERTAIN LIMITATIONS REGARDING THE STATIONING OF ALLIED FORCES ON NORWEGIAN TERRITORY IN PEACE TIME WAS TAKEN ON STRICTLY POLITICAL GROUNDS, AND DID NOT INVOLVE ON THE PART OF NORWAY ANY DENIAL OF THE DOCTRINE OF COLLECTIVE INTEGRATED DEFENCE, A DOCTRINE WHICH HAS ALWAYS BEEN SUPPORTED IN NATO BY NORWAY. I SHALL RECALL IN SOME DETAIL THE BASIC CONSIDERATIONS UNDERLYING THIS DECISION, IN ORDER TO EXPLAIN THE GENERAL COURSE WHICH NORWAY HAS BEEN FOLLOWING WITHIN THE ALLIANCE OVER THE YEARS, AND ALSO BECAUSE THESE CONSIDERATIONS HIGHLIGHT SOME OF THE MAJOR POLITICAL PROBLEMS CONNECTED WITH THE SECURITY OF THE NORTHERN REGION TODAY.

FIRST OF ALL ONE SHOULD REMEMBER THAT NORWAY WAS AT THE TIME THE ONLY NATO COUNTRY BORDERING DIRECTLY ON THE SOVIET UNION. IN THE LIGHT OF THE STRAINED RELATIONS BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND THE WESTERN POWERS IN THAT PERIOD AND ALSO IN LIGHT OF THE VARIOUS SOV-CONFIDENTIAL

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LET WARNINGS AGAINST JOINING NATO, NORWAY'S POSITION WAS CONSIDERED PARTICULARLY DELICATE, REQUIRING RESTRAINT AND THE AVOIDANCE OF STEPS WHICH MIGHT APPEAR PROVOCATIVE.

IT GOES WITHOUT SAYING THAT IT WAS IN THE INTEREST OF NORWAY, AND ALSO IN THE INTEREST OF THE ALLIANCE AS A WHOLE, TO BE ABLE TO UPHOLD WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THIS NEW DEFENCE POLICY, REFERRING TO THE NEED FOR MAINTAINING GOOD RELATIONSHIPS TO OUR POWERFUL EASTERN NEIGHBOUR. SINCE NORWAY JOINED NATO IN 1949 TO TRY TO FIND THE RIGHT BALANCE BETWEEN OUR NEED FOR COLLECTIVE SECURITY IN NATO ON THE ONE HAND, AND THE

NEED TO PRESEVE A RATIONAL AND CONSTRUCTIVE NEIGH-
BOURLY RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIET UNON ON THE OTHER HAND.

TAKING INTO ACCOUNT BOTH THE INTEREST OF NORWAY AND THE
INTEREST OF WORLD PEACE, THE NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT FELT
IN 1949 THAT ONE SHOULD AVOID CREATING PRETEXTS FOR AC-
CUSATIONS THAT NORWAY MIGHT BE USED AS A BRIDGEHEAD FOR
A POSSIBLE WESTERN AGGRESSION AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION.
NORWAY'S POLICY WITH REGARD TO FOREIGN BASES WAS FIRST
DEFINED IN FEBRUARY 1949 IN A NOTE TO THE SOVIET UNION
AS A UNILATERAL DECLARATION OF INTENT. THE RELEVANT
PART READS AS FOLLOWS:

"THE NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT WILL NOT BE A PARTY TO ANY
AGREEMENT WITH OTHER STATES INVOLVING OBLIGATIONS ON
THE PART OF NORWAY TO MAKE AVAILABLE FOR THE ARMED
FORCES OF FOREIGN POWERS BASES ON NORWEGIAN TERRITORY
AS LONG AS NORWAY IS NOT ATTACKED OR SUBJECT TO THE
THREAT OF ATTACK".

ANOTHER ASPECT OF THE SITUATION WAS THE POSITION OF
THE TWO NORDIC COUNTRIES, FINLAND AND SWEDEN, WHICH
HAD ON DIFFERENT PREMISES FOUND DIFFERENT SOLUTIONS
TO THEIR SECURITY PROBLEMS. I THINK THERE WAS REASON
TO FEAR THAT IF ALLID FORCES SHOULD BE STATIONED IN
NORWAY, THE SOVIET UNION MIGHT INVOKE THE CONSULTATION
CLAUSE IN THE FINNO-SOVIET PACT OF FRIENDSHIP AND
MUTUAL SUPPORT AS BASIS FOR DISCUSSING JOINT DEFENCE
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MEASURES. SUCH MEASURES MIGHT, NEEDLESS TO SAY, HAVE
REPERCUSSIONS FOR ALL NORDIC COUNTRIES.
DOMESTIC CONSIDERATIONS NATURALLY ALSO PLAYED THEIR
PART IN THE DECISION TAKEN BY THE NORWEGIAN GOVERN-
MENT. THE DECISIVE BREAK WITH THE TRADITION OF NEU-
TRALITY WAS IN ITSELF A FAR REACHING DECISION. THE
BREAKDOWN OF THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR A SCANDINAVIAN DE-
FENCE UNION HAD FURTHER CREATED SOME FEARS IN NORWEGIAN
PUBLIC OPINION THAT THE NEGATIVE OUTCOME OF THE TALKS
MIGHT AFFECT NORDIC COOPERATIN GENERALLY. ALSO ON
THIS BACKGROUND IT WAS DESIRABLE THAT NORWAY'S COM-
MITMENT TO NATO SHOULD BE SO DEFINED AS NOT TO HARM
NORDIC COOPERATION.

DURING THE PRELIMINARY DISCUSSIONS WHICH NORWAY
INITIATED WITH GREAT BRITIAN AND THE UNITED STATES
ON NORWAY'S SECURITY PROBLEMS, IT APPEARED THAT
THESE GOVERNMENTS SHARED NORWAY'S EVALUATION OF THE
SITUATION BOTH AS REGARDS THE NORDIC AREA AS A WHOLE
AND PARTICULARLY ITS EVALUATION OF NORWAY' SENSI-
TIVE POSITION. IT WAS FURTHER CLEARLY ESTABLISHED
THAT THESE COUNTRIES DID NOT WANT BASES ON NORWEGIAN

TERRITORY.

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ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 IO-14 ACDA-19 ISO-00 AEC-11 MC-02 NEA-14 OIC-04

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USMISSION GENEVA

USDEL MBFR VIENNA

USCINCEUR

USNMR SHAPE

USLOSACLANT

CINCLANT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 USNATO 3322

A GOVERNMENTAL DECLARATION IN 1951 DEFINED THE LIMITS OF
THE GENERAL RESERVATION TAKEN BY NORWAY AS REGARDS THE STATION-
ING OF FOREIGN FORCES ON NORWEGIAN TERRITORY.

THE DECLARATION STATED THAT THIS RESERVATION DOES NOT PREVENT
NORWAY FROM:

- 1) OPENING BASES FOR ALLIED FORCES IN CASE OF ATTACK OR
WHEN WE CONSIDER WE ARE THREATENED WITH AN ATTACK.
- 2) ENTERING INTO CONDITIONAL AGREEMENTS WITH ALLIES TO
PREPARE FOR SUCH SITUATIONS.
- 3) BUILDING FACILITIES PLUS PRE-STORAGES THAT CAN RECEIVE
AND SERVICE ALLIED FORCES AND
- 4) PARTICIPATING IN ALLIED EXERCISES OR RECEIVING SHORT
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VISITS BY ALLIED FORCES.

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THIS CONCEPTION OF OUR BASE POLICY,

MILITARY INSTALLATIONS HAVE BEEN BUILT IN NORWAY UNDER THE NATO INFRASTRUCTURE PROGRAMMES. JOINT NATO EXERCISES ARE ALSO REGULARLY TAKING PLACE IN NORWAY, AND CONTINGENTS FROM INDIVIDUAL NATO COUNTRIES ARE TO A CERTAIN EXTENT TRAINED IN NORWAY TO FAMILIARISE THEM WITH THE SPECIAL CONDITIONS IN OUR COUNTRY.

SUBSEQUENT GOVERNMENTS HAVE REALISED THAT THE POLICY WHICH WAS ADOPTED IN 1949 WITH REGARD TO FOREIGN BASES INVOLVED CERTAIN RISKS, BUT THEY HAVE ALL FELT ON THE BASIS OF A TOTAL EVALUATION OF ALL THE MILITARY AND POLITICAL ASPECTS INVOLVED, THAT THE GENERAL POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS SHOULD PREVAIL.

THE CONSIDERATIONS UNDERLYING NORWAY'S POLICY WITH REGARD TO FOREIGN BASES, ALSO APPLY TO A GREAT EXTENT TO NORWAY'S DECISION IN 1957 NOT TO STOCK NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON NORWEGIAN TERRITORY IN PEACETIME. THUS, THE SPECIAL POSITION ADOPTED BY NORWAY DOES NOT PREVENT US FROM TAKING PART WITHIN THE ALLIANCE IN THE DISCUSSIONS AND FORMULATION OF NATO'S NUCLEAR POLICIES, AS WITNESSED BY OUR MEMBERSHIP IN THIS GROUP.

NORWAY'S POLICY WITH REGARD TO THE STATIONING OF FOREIGN BASES AND ATOMIC WEAPONS CONSTITUTES ALSO TODAY AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN THE CAREFULLY BALANCED SECURITY SITUATION PREVAILING IN THE NORDIC AREA WITHIN THE OVER-ALL BALANCE OF POWER.

TO NORWAY THE JOINT EXERCISES WITH SACLANT, WITH ALLIED COMMAND EUROPE'S MOBILE FORCE AND ALSO THE BILATERAL EXERCISES WITH THE AMERICANS, THE BRITISH AND CANADIANS, ARE OF VITAL IMPORTANCE, NOT ONLY AS EXERCISES, BUT ALSO AS A MEANS TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT IF NORWAY SHOULD BE ATTACKED OR THREATENED BY AN ATTACK, HELP CAN AND WILL BE FORTHCOMING FROM OUR ALLIES IN THE MINIMUM OF TIME. IT IS SIMPLY A MATTER OF MAKING THE DEFENCE OF NORWAY CREDIBLE.

THE EXPANSION OF SOVIET ACTIVITIES IN THE NORTHERN AREA IS CAUSING SOME CONCERN IN NORWAY. THIS EXPANSION SHOULD, OF COURSE, PRIMARILY BE SEEN AS AN ELEMENT IN THE GLOBAL BALANCE OF POWER BETWEEN
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EAST AND WEST. THIS MEANS THAT THE BASE COMPLEX ON KOLA AND THE INCREASED SOVIET ACTIVITY CLOSE TO OUR COUNTRY ALSO REPRESENT A THREAT TO NORWAY. BUT WHETHER THIS THREAT SHALL EVER BECOME ACUTE, WILL PRIMARILY DEPEND ON THE FUTURE BALANCE BETWEEN EAST AND WEST AND HOW RELATIONS DEVELOP, PARTICULARLY BETWEEN THE TWO SUPER-POWERS.

FOR THIS AND OTHER REASONS NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENTS HAVE CONSIDERED THE CAUTIOUS TREND TOWARDS INCREASED SOVIET-AMERICAN UNDERSTANDING AND PARALLEL THINKING IN THE FIELD OF ARMS CONTROL, AS AN ENCOURAGING DEVELOPMENT. PEACE IN THE WORLD WILL TO A

VERY HIGH DEGREE DEPEND ON THESE TWO COUNTRIES
BEING ABLE TO REALISE AND LIVE UP TO THEIR
COMMON INTEREST AND RESPONSIBILITIES IN LIMITING
THE RISK OF MAJOR CONFRONTATIONS AND NUCLEAR WAR.
BUT IN SPITE OF ALL THE CURRENT EFFORTS AIMING AT
REAPPRAISAL AND READJUSTMENT - EFFORTS WHICH ARE
BOTH APPROPRIATE AND UNDERSTANDABLE - I THINK MOST
NORWEGIANS AGREE THAT MANY OF THE BASIC ASSUMP-
TIONS GENERALLY RECOGNIZED 20 YEARS AGO STILL HOLD
GOOD TODAY:

1) THAT THERE IS A FUNDAMENTAL AND MUTUAL INTER-
DEPENDENCE BETWEEN WESTERN EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA
IN THE FIELD OF SECURITY.

2) THAT US MILITARY PRESENCE IN EUROPE IS NECESSARY
TO ENSURE THE PROTECTION BOTH OF EUROPE AND NORTH
AMERICA.

3) THAT AN ADEQUATE DETERRENT AGAINST ATTACK CAN ONLY
BE ASSURED BY UPHOLDING AN INTEGRATED AND WELL-
COORDINATED DEFENCE EFFORT IN PEACETIME.

4) THAT ADEQUATE DEFENSIVE STRENGTH IS STILL A
PREREQUISITE FOR FURTHER DETENTE LEADING TO THE
SETTLEMENT OF OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS ON THE BASIS OF
GIVE AND TAKE.

END TEXT. RUMSFELD
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